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Abstract
While they use the language of game theory known measures of
a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations
assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices
we show that rational players would behave di®erently from the in-
dices predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic
behaviour.
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11 Introduction
Since Shapley and Shubik (1954) adopted the Shapley value to measure a
priori voting power game theory has contributed an enormous literature to
this topic: established theoretical underpinnings for the existing or rediscov-
ered indices, introduced new ones, but the plethora of power indices hints
that there is no single best. What is best depends on the institutional details
concerning the voting that cannot be captured by the voting game the index
is applied to (Laruelle, 1999). Whether one is more interested in comparing
powers of di®erent players in the same game or the powers of the same player
in di®erent games is one crucial choice. Since we are more interested in the
¯rst we focus on normalised indices.
Game theory embraced power indices despite the fact that none of the
power indices are really \game theoretical." Voting situations are games
where \the acquisition of power is the payo®" (Shapley, 1962, p. 59.), but
`acquisition' is an overstatement as players have no strategies: it seems vot-
ing indices are hardly more than statistical measures of the voters' random
behaviour. We like to believe that this is not a realistic model of most voting
situations; we assume that voters are rational who can and want to in°uence
(that is: maximise) their power. (Albert, 2003, makes a similar point).
Motivated by the paradox of quarrelling members (Brams, 1975/2003)
we extend voting games to strategic voting games where players can choose
which coalitions are they willing to join. We show that all known normalised
indices are a®ected by such strategic behaviour.
Our paper is not the ¯rst to disallow certain (winning) coalitions in values
or power indices. Aumann and Drµ eze (1975) assume that property rights may
make it impossible to form every coalition. Owen (1977, 1982) assume that
coalitions are formed exactly in order to increase power. Myerson (1977,
1980) presents a model where players communicate via conferences and not
2all conferences may occur (Faigle and Kern, 1992). The application of such
restrictions to power indices are more recent (Bilbao et al., 1998). Lastly,
Steunenberg et al. (1999) introduce a notion of strategic power based on the
theory of political institutions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a brief introduction
to voting games and an overview of the known indices. We brie°y explain the
paradox of quarrelling members, introduce a framework for strategic indices
and prove some properties.
2 Power indices
A voting situation is a pair (N;W), where N is the set of voters and W
denotes the set of winning coalitions. We consider games where
1. ? = 2 W,
2. if C ½ D ½ E and C;E 2 W then D 2 W
3. If S 2 W and T 2 W then S \ T 6= ;.
Condition 3 requires the game to be proper, Condition 2 is a convexity con-
dition on the poset formed by the winning coalitions. It is often assumed
that N 2 W and then Condition 2 is expressed in terms of N (in the place
of E), in which case we have simple games.
Let ¡ denote the collection of proper convex voting games satisfying the
above properties.
Let M denote the set of minimal winning coalitions: the set of coalitions
without proper winning subsets. Formally: if S 2 M and i 2 S, then
S n fig = 2 W. Clearly M µ W. Surplus coalitions are winning, but non-
minimal.
3Given a game ¡ a power measure · : ¡ ¡! RN
+ assigns to each player
i a non-negative real number ·i, its power; if
P
i2N ·i = 1 then it is also a
power index.
In the following we explain some of the well-known indices.
The Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) applies the Shapley
value (Shapley, 1953) to simple games: Voters arrive in a random order; if
and when a coalition turns winning the full credit is given to the last arriving,
the pivotal player. A player's power is given as the proportion of orderings
where it is pivotal, formally (for simple games) Ái =
# times i is pivotal
n! :
While in simple games any order will yield a unique pivotal player, when
only Condition 2 is satis¯ed, there may be none. (To see this, start the order
with a destructive player, whose membership turns any coalition losing.) In
such cases, to obtain an index a further normalisation is required.
The Banzhaf measure (Penrose, 1946; Banzhaf, 1965) is the probability
that a party is critical for a coalition, that it can turn winning coalitions into
losing ones. Formally Ãi =
# times i is critical
2n¡1 ; when normalised to 1, we get the
Banzhaf index ¯ (Coleman, 1971).
Numerous variants of the (normalised) Banzhaf index exist. In the John-
ston index ° (Johnston, 1978) the credit a critical player gets is inversely
proportional to the number of critical players in the coalition. In e®ect,
coalitions of di®erent sizes have the same contribution to the distribution of
power. Deegan and Packel (1978) argue that only those coalitions form where
the bene¯ts are least divided (Riker, 1962): the Deegan-Packel index ½ only
considers minimal winning coalitions. Finally the Holler-Packel or Public
Good Index h (Holler and Packel, 1983) modi¯es the Deegan-Packel index:
here the bene¯t of forming a winning coalition is given to each and every
player in the coalition. With the normalisation in simple games the index is
nothing but a normalised Banzhaf index, where only minimal coalitions are
taken into account.
4Although there is some disagreement on what should a power index be
like, the ones in use are very much alike. They give credit precisely to the
critical (or swing) players, and give them all the same disregarding their
size. The sole di®erence lies in weighting winning coalitions di®erently. We
consider a general power indices along these lines.
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kC if i is critical
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jCj if no i 2 C is critical,
0 otherwise.
(2.2)




Observe that aC 6= 0 i® C contains critical players.
For instance for the Banzhaf index aC = kC
P
C2W kC.
Players with no power are null. As the set of winning coalitions does
not expand in this model, their situation does not improve. As they merely
create multiplicities in our model, they will simply be ignored. To be precise,
whenever we say surplus player, we exclude null players, and by surplus
coalition we mean a coalition that contains such surplus players.
3 Strategic voting
All existing indices assume an exogenously given set of winning coalitions and
that players join winning coalitions at all times. This seems indeed natural
{ why would players give up part of their power? If for instance two players
start to \quarrel" and refuse to cooperate making any coalition they both
5belong to losing, their power should decrease. Not necessarily. The \Paradox
of Quarrelling Members" (Kilgour, 1974; Brams, 1975/2003) arises when two
players mutually bene¯t from refusing to cooperate with each other.
Paradoxical or not is a matter of interpretation, but players can certainly
acquire (relative) power by approving/rejecting coalitions. In this paper we
extend voting games to allow for such strategic considerations and de¯ne
strategic power indices.
3.1 Examples
As a motivation we present a number of games based on weighted vot-
ing games. Here N is a collection of n interest groups, or parties having
w1;w2;:::;wn individual representatives (wi 2 N+). Let w =
Pn
i=1 wi. We
assume that a quota of w ¸ q > w=2 is required to pass a bill. A coalition
C of parties is winning i®
P
i2C wi ¸ q. Since w > q and wi ¸ 0 weighted
voting games are simple and proper.
Example 1. The game G1 consists of four players represented by their















Notice that in coalition 313221 player 21 is not critical, while the two
larger players are. If 21 can prevent the formation of this coalition, the latter















. Player 21's rejection increased its relative
power. It is therefore not in player 21's interest to join every winning coalition
it is invited to. This ¯nding is not really surprising. In coalition 313221 player
1Subscripts are used to distinguish players with identical weights from each other.
621 assisted players 31 and 32 in forming a winning coalition, but without
getting any credit for it.
Minimal winning coalitions may also be subject to blocks:
Example 2. G2 is a 9-player game with players 51;52;53;11;12;13;14;15;16
and a quota of 11. Here M = f515253;5i5j1k;5i111213141516g, where k 2
f1;2;3;4;5;6g and i;j 2 f1;2;3g with i 6= j. Let W = M. Then the














Now consider W0 = f515253;5i5j1k;5l111213141516g, where k 2 f1;2;3;4;5;6g,














set W0 does not contain the minimal winning coalition 51111213141516, yet
the critical player 51 is better o® as 13
71 > 7
39.
While the aforementioned indices claim to measure power, it seems, play-
ers have actually little power to in°uence their power: hence they are no
more than probabilistic values. The paradox of quarrelling members as well
as the above examples illustrate that players can increase their power by
refusing to participate in certain coalitions. If a player credibly refuses to
participate in a coalition neither him nor his colleagues should get credit for
being critical to a coalition that never forms.
3.2 Model
The idea of quarrelling is generalised to coalitions: a coalition Q quarrels if
any of its members quarrels. Player i's strategy si therefore corresponds to
quarrelling in certain coalitions that i belongs to, thus si µ fCj i 2 Cg and
its strategy space Si ½ 2fCj i2Cg. Note that as C 2 si and C µ D imply
D 2 si not all combinations of quarrelled coalitions are possible.
Only winning coalitions without quarrelling remain winning. Given s =
7fsigi2N the strategy pro¯le, they are collected by
W(s) = fw 2 Wj w 62 si; 8i 2 Ng =
(






Observe that (N;W(s)) is a voting game, thus each strategy pro¯le s
determines a voting game. In this game Conditions 1 and 3 clearly hold
since no new winning coalitions have been added. On the other hand as the
addition of new members to a quarrelling coalition does not make it winning,
convexity, that is: Condition 2 holds, too.
De¯nition 1. A strategic voting game is a quadruple (N;S;W;·) consisting
of a set of players N, a strategy space S, a collection of initial winning
coalitions W and a power index ·.
The acquisition of power is the payo®, so the utility function is simply
· : S ¡! RN
+;s 7¡! ·(N;W(s)). Strategies are in fact sets of coalitions,
the strategy space can be derived from the player set, therefore the triple
(N;W;·) fully de¯nes the game.
The game consists of two stages: a ¯rst, noncooperative game of quar-
relling and a second, implicit, cooperative game of power allocation. Quar-
relling is for good despite incentives to make peace ex-post, which implies
that only asymmetric deviations are possible, introducing quarrelling to ad-
ditional coalitions, but not allowing players to reconcile.
De¯nition 2. A strategic power index is then a vector of equilibrium payo®s,
that is ·(s¤) = ·(N;W(s¤)), where s¤ is a Nash equilibrium: for all i 2 N
and all si µ s¤
i, si 2 Si we have ·i(s¤) ¸ ·i(si;s¤
¡i):
A strategic power index always exists (s¤ where W(s¤) = ? is an equilibrium)
but is generally not unique. In the sequel we provide a unique re¯nement for
certain indices.
84 Results
4.1 Only minimal winning coalitions
Blocking a coalition B a®ects a player in two ways. On the one hand for all
C ¶ B the coalition's weight (Recall the de¯nition in Section 2.) becomes
(aC)0 = 0 and hence the player loses
P
C¶B aC¹C
i , on the other hand, due
to the normalisation, the weight of other coalitions increases, and hence the







Null players are una®ected and are therefore ignored in our analysis.
Proposition 3. Surplus coalitions containing critical players are blocked.
Proof. Consider a coalition B containing a surplus player i. If i is not critical
in B, it is also not critical in C ¾ B (as, by monotonicity if Bnfig is winning,
so is C n fig ¾ B n fig) and therefore aC¹C
i = 0 for all C ¶ B. In sum,
neither B nor C ¾ B yields any pro¯t for i.
On the other hand aB > 0 (and possibly aC > 0 for some C ¾ B), so
when blocking B the power of player i is scaled up according to Expression 4.1
making the block pro¯table.
Corollary 4. For power indices we have M ¶ W(s¤).
Not all minimal coalitions are quarrel-free (see Example 2).
In the following we allow aC > 0 only if C 2 M. Holler and Packel (1983,
p. 24.) argue that \since a non-critical member ...has no incentive to vote
...only these coalitions should be considered for measuring a priori voting
power." Thus a player cannot count on the formation of coalitions that are
not due to his or her power. Interestingly, a similar prediction is made by
aspiration solution concepts (Bennett, 1983, p. 15.).
94.2 Elementary blocks
De¯nition 5. Given a strategy pro¯le s the deviation s0
i is elementary if
js0
ij ¡ js1j = 1, that is, if s0
i extends quarrelling to a single new coalition.
Proposition 6. Given a strategy pro¯le s let s¤
i be i's best response to s¡i.
Then s¤
i can be reproduced by a sequence of elementary deviations.
Proof. Proof by construction. Consider the best response s¤




where, without loss of generality, ¹C1
i · ¢¢¢ · ¹Ck
i . Consider










i. Now suppose that from (s
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i ;s¡i) aC + aCh : (4.3)
The right hand side is a weighted average of ·i(sh
i ;s¡i) and ¹Ch
i hence
·i(sh
i ;s¡i) · ·i(s
h¡1
i ;s¡i) · ¹Ch
i . Since ¹Ch
i · ¹Ch+1
i · ¢¢¢ · ¹Ck by a




i ;s¡i), hence s¤
i
is not a best response. Contradiction, therefore each elementary deviation is
pro¯table.
We have considered a particular sequence of elementary deviations. Clearly
if Ch cannot be blocked pro¯tably, the property extends to all Cg, g ¸ h as
¹Ch · ¹Cg. Would an alternative sequence of blocking C1 :::Ch¡1 work? By
the pro¯tability of previous deviations player i's power has strictly monotone
increasing until ·i(s
h¡1
i ;s¡i). Assuming the same coalitions can be blocked
pro¯tably in di®erent orders to get to (s
h¡1
i ;s¡i) (if not, the sequence can
clearly be dropped), at an intermediate stage i's power is less, making the
same blocking of Ch even more di±cult.
A similar argument (that we skip here) proves a more general result.
10Proposition 7. Given a strategy pro¯le s and consider a deviation s0
i. Then
s0
i can be reproduced by a sequence of elementary deviations if and only if for
all s00
i, such that s0
i ¾ s00
i ¾ si, we have ·i(s0
i;s¡i) ¸ ·i(s00
i;s¡i) ¸ ·i(s).
The message is clear: a player may quarrel too much, while blocking some
\bad" coalitions, a few good ones may get blocked, too. While this may still
result in an overall pro¯table deviation, a player should be more conservative
in choosing its strategies. The above results show that there is a simple rule
of thumb: use elementary deviations; we even have a recipe: ¯rst eliminate
the worst coalitions. In the following, by deviation, we mean elementary
deviations.
Now observe that for minimal winning coalitions C 6= D we have neither
C ½ D nor D ½ C, therefore by blocking C a player will not block D
and vice versa, a player has the possibility to block each minimal winning
coalition separately. In sum, our model can be reduced to players picking
which coalitions they do not want to form. This result makes it particularly
easy to work with coalitions rather than strategies.
4.3 Friendly equilibrium selection
While s¤, where W(s¤) = ? is a Nash-equilibrium this is neither the only
one nor the one we want (for one, power indices are unde¯ned here); out of
the many Nash equilibria we make a selection.
Our approach is conservative: A whole literature has been built on the
idea that all coalitions should form; we accept this status quo. If this is
not a Nash-equilibrium, a player deviates and the status quo is replaced by
another, and so on. We consider strategy pro¯les that can arise as results
of such sequences of elementary deviations from the classical setting. These
11are collected by the friendly set F :




si = ? 8i 2 N
9i 2 N;9(s0
i;s¡i) 2 F; such that ·i(s) > ·i(s0
i;s¡i):
Note that while we speak in terms of elementary deviations, these can be
aggregated into single deviations. We do, however forbid deviations that fail
to meet the conditions of Proposition 7, that is, deviations that go too far.
This, too, could be regarded as an aspect of our conservative approach.
We select friendly equilibria s¤ 2 F that are Nash equilibria and are
maximal for inclusion. The equilibrium set of winning coalitions is W¤ =





In the following we prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium for the class
of power indices that take only minimal coalitions into account.
Lemma 8. A block by player i is pro¯table if and only if the blocked coalition
gives less credit to player i than the average credit it gets, that is, than its
power index.
Proof. Given a strategy pro¯le s player i pro¯tably blocks coalition B i®




























C2W(s) aC = ·i(s) > ¹
B
i ; (4.6)
12Proposition 3 can also be seen as a corollary of this lemma.
Lemma 8 hints a relation to the theory of aspirations (Bennett, 1983),
although this relation turns out to be super¯cial. In the theory of aspirations
it is not some coalition's payo® that is bargained over: players make their
claims and unless their claims are satis¯ed certain coalitions will or will not
form. Here this claim is expressed by their power index, the \typical" credit
they receive and players make the same claim in all coalitions. Unfortunately




i = 1 a vector of aspirations will almost always
be larger. Bennett (1983, p. 15.) provides the following example:
Example 3. A game with 5 players with weights 2, 2, 1, 1, and 1, and a
quota of 5. Here the unique partnered, balanced, equal gains aspiration is






Now we move on to our main result.
Theorem 9. Let (N;S;W;·) be a strategic voting game, such that in ·i =
P
C22Nn? aC¹C
i we have aC = 0 for all C 62 M. The friendly equilibrium set






In order to prove this theorem we need some additional results.
Proposition 10. Let Ci;Cj 2 W be coalitions such that fi;jg µ Ci\Cj and
i and j want to block Ci and Cj respectively. Then either i wants to block Cj
or j wants to block Ci.
Proof. Assume that the proposition is false: Player j blocks Cj, hence ¹
Cj
j <
·j(W) but i does not block, hence ¹
Cj





Similarly i blocks Ci, hence ¹
Ci
i < ·i(W). By our assumption j does not
block, hence ¹
Ci








j . Since Ci












Proposition 11. For all Wi;Wj 2 F we have Wi \ Wj 2 F.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the di®erences between Wi and Wj.
First we deal with the elementary step. Assume Wi = fA;C1;C2;:::Cmg,
Wj = fB;C1;C2;:::Cmg, that is, the two sets only di®er in 1 element each.
This ensures that their intersection is non-trivial. Wi and Wj are descendants
of a common ancestor W0 = fA;B;C1;C2;:::Cmg, but after blocking B and
A, respectively by some players i and j. The proposition merely states that
either blocking A is pro¯table from Wi or blocking B is pro¯table from Wj.
Wi is the result of blocking B by i. If j = 2 B then ·j(W0) · ·j(Wi). We
know that j blocks A at W0 and hence ·j(W0) > ¹A
j . Hence ·j(Wi) > ¹A
j ,
which implies that j also blocks A at Wi. Thus Wij = fC1;C2;:::Cmg 2 F.
The symmetric case gives the corresponding result for i and B at Wj.
Finally we must consider the case where none of the previous two cases
applied, that is where j 2 B and i 2 A. As only a member can block a coali-
tion, we also have j 2 A and i 2 B. Therefore we can apply Proposition 10
to show that i blocks at Wj or j at Wi, which, as before, gives the result.
We have discussed all possible cases which completes the ¯rst part of the
proof. Now we move on to the general case. Assume that we have shown the
result for all pairs of sets with di®erences up to k ¡ 1.
Now consider Wi = fA1;A2;:::;Ak;C1;C2;:::Cmg as well as Wj =
fB1;B2;:::;Bl;C1;C2;:::Cmg, where A1;A2;:::;Ak and B1;B2;:::;Bl rep-
resent the blocks that did not take place and l · k. (Possibly Ap = Bq for
some p and q.) The question is whether this di®erence can be eliminated.
By de¯nition if Wi 2 F there exists a sequence of blocks starting from
W0 that lead to Wi and a similar sequence exists to Wj. Let W0
i and W0
j be
the ¯rst elements that are not common, without loss of generality, as results




14belongs to F.2 Now take the next set W2 along the path to Wi, W1
i . By the
same argument W1
i \ W1
j also belongs to F. Repeating this argument we
travel parallel to the path and in the penultimate step we get W
p
j 2 F. For
the last time by the same argument Wi \ W
p
j = fA2;:::;Ak;C1;C2;:::Cmg
also belongs to F. If l < k, our inductive assumption can be used to complete
the proof.
In case l = k it is necessary to apply the same argument once more, but
on the other side: to show that fB2;:::;Bl;C1;C2;:::Cmg 2 F.
Proof of Theorem. By Proposition 11 pairwise intersections of elements of F
also belong to F. As the number of winning coalitions is ¯nite the result on
pairwise intersections implies that W¤ as de¯ned in Equation 4.7 belongs to
F. Clearly W¤ µ w for all w 2 F. Therefore W¤ is the smallest friendly set
of winning coalitions and is trivially an equilibrium.
Corollary 12. The strategic power index ·¤ is well-de¯ned.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a model that measures power taking the rational, utility
maximising behaviour of players into account. We have also shown that
none of the well-known power indices account for this behaviour. It appears
that these supposedly game theoretic concepts are not more than statistical
measures of random behaviour.
There are at least two possibilities to resolve this con°ict. The one we
chose is to modify existing power indices so that no credit is given for coali-
tions that do not form. The advantage of this solution is that it is directly
motivated by the problem and gives a perfect answer to it without a®ecting
the concepts a great deal.
2Our notation is slightly misleading as W1
j is not necessarily on the path to Wj, but
this should not lead to confusion.
15While this is the option we choose here there is an interesting alternative.
Observe that blocking a winning coalition may be advantageous to some
players, but it will hurt others in the coalition. The only players whose
power will surely increase are those outside the coalition. This indicates that
overall members of the coalition lose by not forming the coalition. Hence
forming the coalition increases the power of the members and therefore there
exists distributions of this power that bene¯t all members. Giving room for
renegotiation would lead us to cooperative, probably set-like solutions and
would make us lose the advantages of a single-point solution concept.
Two other choices we have made are to assume that blocking coalition
C also blocks D ¾ C and to work with power indices de¯ned over minimal
winning coalitions only. Blocking single coalitions would not preserve null
players who could gain power for \mediation" (turning a blocked coalition
into a winning one by their entry { of course this coalition would be blocked
soon, too) and would allow non-minimal winning coalitions that are not
surplus coalitions as they would only consist of critical players. While our
original model considered a variant of this alternative, in order to avoid
such odd phenomena one has to separate the notions of winning a feasible
coalition.
Finally, the uniqueness of the friendly equilibrium for power indices also
looking at surplus coalitions remains an open problem. With the aforemen-
tioned model counterexamples can be presented here a systematic search for
them was in vain, now we believe the result to hold, but the present proof
does not directly extend to those indices.
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